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Labor Unions and Title VII: A Bit Player at
the Creation Looks Back

Theodore J. St. Antoine

During the debates over what became Title VII (Equal Employment
Opportunity) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 I was the junior partner
of the then General Counsel of the AFL-CIO,]. Albert Woll. T here were
only three of us in the firm. The 1niddle partner, Robert C. Mayer, handled the business affairs of the Federation and our other union clients.
Bob was also the son-in-law of George Meany, president of the AFLCIO, which gave us a unique access to Meany's thinking. The Federation had only one in-house lawyer, Associate General Counsel Thomas
Everett Harris. Tom was an aristocratic Southerner and a brilliant lawyer
who had clerked for Justice Harlan Fiske Stone on the U.S. Supreme
Court. He and I were the labor law technicians, and we briefed and occasionally argued the court and administrative cases in which the Federation became involved, usually in an amicus capacity.
The often-fraught relationship of organized labor and the civil rights
movement is a well-known story. 2 Before Title VII, African Americans
were openly excluded from membership in most railroad unions, and
their numbers were sharply limited in the skilled construction trades,
even though all those unions eventually had the legal obligation to provide "fair representation" of any minorities who did manage to get jobs

252

A Nation of Widening Opportunities

within the unions' jurisdiction. 3 Given the mores and culture of that
time, it was probably inevitable that many if not most rank-and-file
union workers placed their perceived economic self-interest above any
concerns about promoting racial equality. Yet the story is more complicated than that of white workers simply taking advantage of discrimination against black workers, and the other side of the story needs to
be remembered. Union leadership took a more principled position, and
ultimately the official policy of the AFL-CIO was to support passage
of the Civil Rights Act, including the prohibition of discrimination in
employment by both employers and unions.
The initial bill proposed by the Kennedy administration would have
concentrated on voting rights, access to public accommodations, and
public school desegregation. 4 A fair employment practices (FEP) provision was considered too controversial and likely to doom the entire
package. Two very different men, Walter Reuther and George Meany,
played the key roles in shaping organized labor's response and helping
to secure the addition of the Title VII that was finally adopted. Reuther,
president of the United Automobile Workers and head of the AFL-CIO's
Industrial Union Department (largely the former CIO unions before
the merger), had long been a champion of black workers' civil rig.hts,
including equal job rights, and was a member of the NAACP's board
of directors. He was an eloquent speaker and a charismatic, sometimes
imperious leader who on occasion could strain the patience even of his
natural allies. On june 13, 1963, he and other labor leaders met with President Kennedy, and Reuther made an "impassioned plea" for the inclusion of an FEP title in the administration's civil rights bill.5 About a week
later, Reuther joined a group of top civil rights leaders to see the president at the White House to reiterate the demand. 6 Reuther also participated in the March on Washington in August 1963, becoming the sole
white union speaker when Martin Luther King delivered his famous "I
Have a Dream" oration?
In personality, AFL-CIO President George Meany and Walter Reuther
were almost polar opposites. Reuther resonated to abstract principles
and noble causes. Meany, who hailed from the Plumbers Union in New
York City, was a cautious, crafty politician, struggling to hold together
a highly divergent coalition of labor adherents. In contrast to Reuther's
vaulting, evangelical speaking style, Meany's oral presentations were
clear, methodical, down-to-earth. Yet Meany could also be moved by
the plight of black workers. Although he would not have the AFL-CIO
endorse the March on Washington, he set out on his own to convey
the message to the White House that an FEP provision was essential,
including coverage of labor unions. As reported through my partner,
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Bob Mayer, President Kennedy responded: "George, I didn't think we
needed one. I thought you could keep your troops in line." At this point
Reuther might have delivered a sermon on the evils of racial discrimination. Meany's riposte was characteristically hard-nosed and lacking in
self-righteousness: "Mr. President, that's exactly the problem. I can't keep
the troops in line. I need a law I can blame!" More formally, Meany told
the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee in july 1963: "We need
the power of the federal government to do what we are not fully able to
do [by ourselves]."8
It can be argued whether the Meany or Reuther style was ultimately
more effective. It is certainly true that at least for some significant listeners, Reuther's moralistic hectoring could wear thin over time. When the
March on Washington leaders met afterward with president Kennedy,
Martin Luther King modestly sought to divert attention from his own
great speech by asking the president whether he had heard Reuther's
excellent address. Kennedy replied dryly, "Oh, I've heard him plenty of
times." 9 Numerous persons who found Reuther more congenial philosophically wound up fonder of Meany personally. How might that affect
persuasiveness? What is most important in the long run, however, is
that these two men, Meany and Reuther, in their diverse ways, united
in getting the labor movement officially to back the cause of an equal
employment opportunity title. It is still debatable just how critical union
support was. At least one reasonably disinterested observer, Professor
Nelson Lichtenstein, then at the University of Virginia, declared flatly:
"The trade union movement, both the AFL-CIO and the UAW, was
primarily responsible for the addition of FEPC, now rechristened the
Equal Etnployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), to the original
Kennedy bill." 10 But Herbert Hill, former labor secretary of the NAACP,
has bitterly attacked this view, insisting that it exaggerated the position
of organized labor as a progressive social force and overlooked massive
union efforts to marginalize the effects of Title VII as finally enacted.11
The AFL-CIO's leadership endorsernent of an FEP or EEO provision
did not end the matter, however, in the eyes of much of the rank-andfile. Senator Lister Hill of Alabama was an ardent segregationist but an
economic populist. He somehow obtained the addresses of about seventy thousand local unions affiliated with nationals belonging to the
AFL-CIO. He wrote them, warning that passage of the civil rights bill
would destroy one of their most prized possessions, seniority. Seniority
reflects time with a particular employer or in a particular job or department. It can determine priority in layoffs, recalls, promotions, and fringe
benefits like vacations. In many locations, especially in the South, black
workers were deprived of access to the better job lines and the seniority
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attached to them. As a result of Hill's intervention, AFL-CIO headquarters was inundated with outraged cries from local memberships, protesting this threat to their precious seniority rights. I was assigned to draft
the Federation's response.
My thoughts were as follows, although the exact wording was the result
of refinement by several hands:
Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. Its effect is
prospective and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a business has been
discriminating in the past and as a result has an all -white working force,
when the title comes into effect the employer's obligation would be simply
to fill future vacancies on a nondiscriminatory basis. He would not be
obliged-or indeed, permitted- to fire whites in order to hire Negroes or to
prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes are hired to give them
special seniority rights at the expense of the white workers hired earlier.
That language was later adopted, after extensive negotiations by AFLCIO representatives and the legislation's sponsors, by Senators Joseph
S. Clark (Democrat of Pennsylvania) and C1ifford P. Case (Republican of
New Jersey), in an "Interpretive Memorandum" on Title VII, for which
they were the "bipartisan captains" in the Senate. 12 The Justice Department submitted a rebuttal to the arguments of Senator Lister Hill to the
same effect. 13
Once the 1964 Civil Rights Act was safely passed and Title VII became
law, civil rights groups understandably downplayed this particular legislative history and insisted that the "current perpetuation" of past discrimination in seniority constituted a present violation of the statute.
As one African American lawyer friend put it to me: "Ted, I was not
part of whatever compromise may have been struck in getting Title VII
enacted, and as a good advocate I am going to push the statutory language as far as l think it should go." As it turned out, that was quite a way.
Until the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the issue, six courts of appeals
in more than thirty cases held that seniority systems that perpetuated
the effects of pre-Act discrimination did violate Title VII. 14 Two other
courts of appeals were in accord in dicta. 15 In International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States, 16 however, a 7-2 Supreme Court majority ruled
that § 703(h) of Title VII (and the legislative history previously cited)
immunized bona fide seniority systems from liability under the CRA.
Naturally, I believe the majority got it right. Section 703(h) provides in
pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards
of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which
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measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or to employees
who work in different locations, provided that such differences are not the
result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or
. al ongm
. . ... 17
natiOn

Civil rights proponents protested, not unreasonably, that the inevitable
tendency of the seniority cases was to lock a whole generation of African
American workers into the less desirable jobs to which pre-Title VII
discrimination had confined them. Even if they somehow managed to
move into the higher-level jobs that were now theoretically available to
them, they would wind up at the very bottom of the seniority ladder for
those positions or departments. They would thus risk being the first laid
off and the last recalled in the event of any economic downturn, as well
as losing other benefit priorities. Those were indeed the regrettable facts.
But labor leaders wishing to support Title VII also faced some harsh
realities. The rank-and-file were up in arms over what they perceived
(correctly, as it first developed) to be a serious threat to their valuable
seniority. Union officials must face elections, and the 1960s were a time
of flux, when numerous incumbents were voted out of office. The
Kennedy administration was initially opposed to an FEP or EEO title,
with the Justice Department calling labor-liberal efforts to add one "a
disaster.1118 Under all those circumstances, it seems entirely sensible for
Title VII supporters among the labor leadership to feel they had to mollify their memberships by preserving seniority rights as they did. In
effect, postponing for a generation the full promise of Title VII's nondiscrimination strictures may well have been the price that had to be paid
to get an EEO title. By its very nature, of course, a bona fide seniority
plan can hold back only about one generation when it is set in the context of a law prohibiting discrimination in hiring, promotions, and other
terms and conditions of employment.
Retired federal District Judge Nancy Gertner has asserted: "Federal
judges from the trial court to the Supreme Court have interpreted the
[Civil Rights] Act virtually, although not entirely, out of existence."19
Judge Gertner places much emphasis on the actual experience of discrimination plaintiffs compared to other plaintiffs in the litigation
process, from summary judgment through trial through appeal. In what
is surely the single most important judicial gloss on Title VII, however,
the Supreme Court came out most favorably for alleged victims of discrimination. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co}° Chief Justice Burger spoke
for a unanimous Court in holding that the statute was violated not only
by intentional discrimination but also by the use of any job qualification-such as a high school education or passing a general intelligence
test-that disproportionately disqualifies a particular protected group
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and is not shown to be significantly related to successful job performance.
Griggs thus introduced the now famous "disparate impact" theory of
discrimination, as distinguished from the more conventional "disparate
treatment" or intentional theory. Subsequently, the Court acknowledged: "Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil
Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII." 21 The Court went on
to state that disparate impact claims "involve employment practices that
are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups, but that in fact
fall more harshly on one group than another, and cannot be justified
by business necessity.... Proof of discriminatory motive .. .is not required
under a disparate-impact theory." 22
For someone like me, who was concededly only a bit player in this
great undertaking but who nonetheless had a ringside seal at it, it is significant that I cannot ever recall during the endless discussions of Title
VII any explicit reference to something like the "disparate impact" theory. Moreover, despite the Griggs Court's tussle with the legislative history, I find nothing there that clearly and positively supports disparate
impact. 23 Chief Justice Burger invoked a striking image when he said:
"Congress has now provided that tests or criteria for employment or
promotion may not provide equality of opportunity merely in the sense
of the fabled offer of milk to the stork and the fox." 24 But the artistry
cannot conceal the conclusory, unproven nature of the proposition. Section 703(h), the one provision expressly dealing with testing, states in
pertinent part:
[N]or shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give
and to act upon Lhe results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not
designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion,
sex or national origin.25

Chief Justice Burger found comfort in the word "used" in the sentence
dealing with ability tests; it does not appear in the part of the same section dealing with seniority and merit systems. That can be scored as a
good debater's point. But in the absence of any further explanation of
its significance in the legislative history, one has to wonder about how
much weight to attach to that single generalized word. Would Congress
have been that indirect or circumspect in promulgating a whole new
theory of discrimination?
How necessary was the disparate impact theory, anyway? Section
8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act prohibits "discrimination... to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization."26 In
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NLRB v. Brown, the Supreme Court concluded that "Congress clearly
intended the employer's purpose in discriminating to be controlling." 27
But then the Court immediately added:
[W]hen an employer practice is inherently destructive of employee rights
and is not justified by the service of important business ends, no specific evidence of intent to discourage union membership is necessary to establish a
violation of§ 8(a)(3). This principle, we have said, is "but an application of the
common-law rule that a man is held to intend the foreseeable consequences
of his conduct."28
As I see it, most if not all of what the Court accomplished in Griggs
through enunciating the new disparate impact theory under Title VII
could have been achieved less controversially by an application of the
commonsense principle that persons may be held to have intended the
natural consequences of their actions. 29 Does anyone have any serious doubts about what Duke Power was up to when it instituted new
job qualifications on the very day Title VII went into effect? At most,
disparate treatment analysis would seem to permit a challenged party
one free pass on a claim of business necessity as a defense. Once that
defense was overcome and the consequences known, any continuation of
the practice could appropriately be regarded as an intentional violation.
One can safely say that even the present conservative Supreme Court
would be reluctant to back away from the unanimous decision in Griggs.
Moreover, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress confirmed the existence of disparate-impact violations by spelling out their manner of
proof in a new§ 703(k).30 Nonetheless, in a concurring opinion in Ricci v.
DeStefano, Justice Scalia warned that the Court's disposition of that case
"mer ely postpones the evil day on which the Court will have to confront
the question: Whether, or to what extent, are the disparate-impact provisions of Title Vll ... consistent with the Constitution's guarantee of equal
protection?"31 Justice Scalia elaborated his position:
[T]itle VII's disparate-impact provisions place a racial thumb on the scales,
often requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies,
and to make decisions based on (because of) those racial outcomes. That
type of racial decisionmaking is, as the Court explains, discriminatory. 32
Professor Richard Primus suggests a means of defending d isparate
impact analysis. 33 He starts by spelling out what he calls the Ricci
premise: the City of New Haven's suspension of a written job test
because of its disproportionately adverse effect on African American
firefighters "would constitute disparate treatment under Title VII unless
suspending the test were justified by Title VII's provisions regarding
disparate impact."34 Primus concedes that if the emphasis is placed on
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the race conscious action of a public employer (subject to constitutional
limitations) in implementing a disparate impact remedy, which is how
Justice Scalia sees it, disparate impact doctrine is likely to be in "fatal"
conflict with equal protection's requirement of racial neutrality. 35
Primus insists, however, that there are two other ways of viewing the
situation. First, there is an institutional difference between the roles of
public employers and courts. 36 Courts are authorized to remedy racial
discrimination and they cannot assess any kind of discrimination claim
without knowing the race of the parties. Public employers are precluded from such race-conscious decision making. Second, the attention may focus on the visible victims. 37 In Ricci, Primus points out, New
Haven's decision "disadvantaged determinate and visible innocent third
parties-that is, the white firefighters," while "[m]ost disparate impact
remedies avoid creating such victims."38 Primus concludes that the constitutionality of disparate impact doctrine may turn on the particular
lens through which the Court subsequently views such equal protection
claims-and the skill of advocates in bringing the right case before the
Court. 39 My own conclusion is that the Griggs Court could have avoided
these problems by a more generous and realistic reading of Congress's
actual design-to prohibit intentional discrimination in all its manifestations.
The problem of disparate impact pales by comparison with the problem of "affirmative action"-conceptually, ethically, and sociologically.
Affirmative action-racial or other preferences among human
groups-to achieve some seemingly desirable or compelling public
interest is well covered by other contributors to this volume. 40 I will
therefore limit myself to a few brief personal observations. The first and
most obvious is that the primary, abiding theme of both the text and the
legislative history of Title VII is color-blindness (or equivalent blindness
regarding gender and other protected categories). The Clark-Case Memorandum filed by the senators who were in effect floor managers for the
EEO provision is replete with such references. It is a model of the "plain
meaning" approach to language:
It has been suggested that the concept of discrimination is vague. In fact it
is clear and simple and has no hidden meanings. To discriminate is to make
a distinction, to make a difference in treatment or favor, and those distinctions or differences in treatment or favor which are prohibited by section
704 [now 703] are those which are based on any five of forbidden criteria:
race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.41

Congress, like the rest of us promoting equal employment opportunity,
was very naive-or else we all affected naivete. It was as if the magic
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wand of one federal statute could erase three hundred years of bondage,
degradation, and exclusion. At least by hindsight, we know it did not
work.
Justice Brennan showed more sophistication when he wrote fo r the
Court in the Weber case:
It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over
centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who
had ''been excluded from the American dream for so long," constituted the
first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to
abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy.4 2

In Weber, a 5-2 Court upheld the legality of a union-employer affirmative action plan that reserved 50 percent of the openings in a plant's
craft training program until the percentage of black craft workers in the
plant was commensurate with the percentage of blacks in the local labor
force. 43 Yet however much one might wish to applaud the result in Weber
on the basis of policy, it contained a very serious analytical flaw. Justice
Brennan never came to grips with the meaning of the critical word, "discriminate."
The Clark-Case Memorandum equated "discriminate" with "distinguish" on certain specified grounds. That reading, if straightforwardly
applied, would have been fatal to the Weber approach. But lhere is
another way to interpret "discriminate." One of the great federal judges,
Henry Friendly, had this to say: "Although '[i]n common parlance, the
word (to discriminate) means to distinguish or differentiate,'.. .it more
often means, both in common and particularly in legal parlance, to
distinguish or differentiate without sufficient reason."44 That could have
opened the door to a more capacious interpretation than a strictly literal
reading. Once Justice Brennan had accomplished that, his reliance on
the spirit rather than the letter of the law, and his use of somewhat
strained but favorable portions oflegislative history, would have seemed
more acceptable.
Another aspect of Weber has always seemed anomalous to me as someone who is not a constitutional specialist. Justice Brennan emphasized it
right at the outset of his analysis: "Since the Kaiser-USWA plan does not
involve state action, this case does not present an alleged violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."45 The implication is that equal protection would have been a more stringent standard
for a valid affirmative action plan. 1ndeed, subsequent decisions invalidating the plans of governmental bodies appear to bear that out.46 Yet
it is Title VII that defines the prohibited conduct so explicitly as "to discriminate ... because of...race."47 Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment
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does not even mention race and speaks very broadly: u[N]or shall any
State ...deny to any person wilhin its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."48 If one emphasizes the text, "equal protection" is surely
the more flexible test. And a philosopher whose mind was uncluttered
by vacillating judicial pronouncements might well conclude that a state
is not denying equal protection when it treats differently-and preferentially-groups of persons who are in fact differently-and
unequally-situated.49 Those unequal situations could be the result of
hurricanes, earthquakes, plagues, or physical or mental disabilities. Why
not generations of racial discrimination?
I hardly expect a return to such a pristine concept at this relatively
advanced stage in the development of equal protection theory. But the
more we recognize that the equal treatment of unequals may not be the
best way to ensure the "equal protection of the laws," the more we may
be ready to extend such established doctrines as "compelling state interest" as a qualification on the prohibition of racial distinctions.
A half-century ago, many of us, those in the civil rights movement
and union supporters alike, shared Martin Luther King's "dream." The
"dream" was a dream of genuine integration-the existence of all races
in our society on a plane of equality. We felt Title VII was our vehicle. Yet
fifty years after the passage of Title VII, the median household income
of blacks is $33,321 while that of whites is $57,009, or 71 percent more.50
The unemployment rate of blacks is 12.5 percent, or double that of
whites at 6.2 percent. 51 We may have come a long way in certain respects
since 1964. But to fulfill that dream, we still have a very long way to go.
About the Author

James E. & Sarah A. Degan Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Mt.chigan.
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